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Anthropology, Mythology and Art:
Reading Beuys through Heidegger
NICOLA FOSTER
Beuys the mythmaker Shaman
Most  celebrated  artists  are  as  influential  artistically  as  they  are 
critically.  Beuys’  reception  to  date,  remains  controversial  and 
contradictory; his artistic influence is unquestioned but this is not 
matched  by  his  critical  acclaim.  In  an  attempt  to  address  this 
difficulty with the publication of  Joseph Beuys: Mapping the Legacy 
(2001), Gene Ray notes that Beuys “inspired, enabled, or enriched 
important directions of contemporary art production, from what 
can broadly be called ‘history of art’ to installation, performance, 
and  environmental  art”,  (Ray  2001:  1).  And  yet,  despite  his 
overwhelming influence in the artistic world, critical reception of 
Beuys remains somewhat polarised and contentious. 
Interestingly, perhaps the most critical essay came in response to 
Beuys’ 1979/80 retrospective exhibition at the Guggenheim New 
York.  In  his  essay  “Beuys:  The  Twilight  of  the  Idol”  (Artforum 
1980),  Benjamin  Buchloh  is  disturbed  by  what  he  sees  as  “the 
aesthetic  conservatism of  Beuys […] logically  complemented by 
his  politically  retrograde,  not  to  say  reactionary,  attitudes” 
(Buchloh in Ray 2001: 23). Buchloh goes on to argue that the root 
of the problem lies in Beuys’  misconception that “politics could 
become a matter of aesthetics” and he goes on to compare this to 
Walter  Benjamin’s  critique  of  fascism  as  the  aesthetisation  of 
politics and war. Buchloh is thus concerned by what he sees as the 
uncritical reception of Beuys where he is presented as “a national 
hero of the first order”, “a cult figure” and “a figure of worship”, 
with  references  to  Hitler’s  reception  in  Germany  some  years 
earlier. Though more recently art historians are examining Beuys’ 
work  more  carefully  and  critically,  Buchloh’s  critique  is  still 
influential  and stands in  the  way of  any attempt  to re-examine 
Beuys’ work today. 
In his essay “The Ends of Art According to Beuys” published in 
October in  1988,  Eric  Michaud  offers  the  following  helpful 
comment:
The disturbing element in Beuys’ work is not to be found in 
his drawings, which have their place in public and private 
collections throughout the world,  nor his ‘performances’, 
which have their place within the Fluxus movement and 
within a general  investigation of  the limits  of  art.  It  lies 
rather, I believe, in the flood of pronouncements testifying 
to  the  privilege that  he gave,  throughout  his  lifetime,  to 
spoken over plastic language. (Michaud 1988: 36) 
Michaud’s comment points to two interrelated and closely linked 
difficulties  in  the  reception  of  Beuys’  work:  one  regarding  the 
status of Beuys’ spoken words and statements, the other regarding 
the  artist’s  insistence  on  the  prioritisation  he  allocates  to  the 
spoken word and communication through language.    
The status of Beuys’ spoken statements is perhaps  the stumbling 
block for many critics and art historians and Buchloh is a good 
example. Depending on how they read Beuys’ spoken statements, 
interpreters have offered a range of responses. Buchloh reads such 
statements as descriptive, explanatory and external to the artwork, 
though nonetheless explaining the artwork. Hence he is  keen to 
point out that in Germany at the time, those who were seriously 
involved in radical student politics did not interpret Beuys’ spoken 
statements as “anything more than simple-minded utopian drivel 
lacking  elementary  political  and  educational  practicability” 
(Buchloh in Ray 2001: 201). According to Buchloh, a serious avant-
garde  artist  would  be  expected  to  offer  descriptive  and 
explanatory comments that would show how their artwork also 
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operates  towards  appropriate  ethical,  social  and  political  goals. 
Beuys’  spoken comments do not  operate this way – much of  it 
evokes mysticism and naïve utopianism – and Buchloh is unable 
to  interpret  the  works  beyond  a  mere  return  to  a-historical 
mysticism and conservatism  demonstrated  by  works  that  make 
references to anthropological mysticism. 
For Buchloh,  Beuys had not  understood the innovation brought 
about  by Duchamp’s  readymades and as a  result,  he  concludes 
that  there  is  nothing  of  artistic  innovation  and value  in  Beuys’ 
work. Hence he argues that:
Beuys  does  not  change  the  state  of  the  object  within 
discourse itself. Quite the contrary, he dilutes and dissolves 
the  conceptual  precision  of  Duchamp’s  readymade  by 
reintegrating the object into the most traditional and naïve 
context  of  representation  of  meaning,  the  idealist 
metaphor: this object stands for that idea, and that idea is 
represented in this object. (Buchloh in Ray 2001: 206) 
Buchloh  insists  that  whilst  Beuys  is  intrigued by  Duchamp,  he 
does not understand the artistic innovation introduced by the lat-
ter artist’s readymades. Instead, he argues, Beuys offers us a return 
to notions of the naïve primitive with references to anthropological 
and ethnographical presentations. We are offered, he says, “with-
ering relics and vestiges of past activities”, souvenirs of the past 
enshrined “in specifically designed glass and wood cases that look 
like […] vitrines in Victorian museums of ethnography” (Buchloh 
in Ray 2001: 200). From Buchloh’s perspective, Beuys’ position is 
closer to fascism than to any attempt to mourn and seek forgive-
ness for this past.
For Buchloh,  Beuys remains a conservative artist  who offers  no 
innovation and has not come to terms with recent artistic history. 
He  offers  a  quotation  from  Beuys’  comments  on  his  “Bathtub” 
(1960) as an example: 
But it would be wrong to interpret the bathtub as a kind of 
self-reflection.  Nor does it  have anything to do with the 
concept of  the readymade: quite the opposite,  since here 
the stress is on the meaning of the object. It relates to the 
reality  of  being  born  in  such  an  area  and  in  such 
circumstances. (Buchloh in Ray 2001: 206)
Buchloh expects “Bathtub” to be a reference to Duchamp and, as 
such,  to  make  formal  references  to  the  readymade;  Beuys’ 
emphasis, Buchloh’s comment suggests, is on “the meaning of the 
object”. For Buchloh, art that seeks to offer “meaning” also implies 
that such “meaning” is metaphysical,  “spiritual” and a-historical 
as opposed to social, historical, political and ethical. According to 
the  art  historian,  then,  the  “meaning”  offered  in  such  work  is 
traditional,  whether  it  is  linked  to  Western  religion  or 
anthropological mysticism. 
Paul  Wood  shares  Buchloh’s  suspicions  and  points  out  –  with 
reference to Beuys’ other works and his accompanying statements 
–  that  in  contemporary  contexts,  there  are  difficulties  in 
establishing “the  meaning of  an object”  understood in terms of 
symbolic meaning, solely on the basis of the visual:  
Erased crosses do not ‘mean’ the union of East and West 
any more than dead hares are valid symbols of nomadic 
freedom from modern materialism. One of the key features 
of  the contemporary social order  has been,  precisely,  the 
loss  of  a  common symbolic  repertoire  of  the  kind  more 
organic cultures collectively invest in religion. (Wood 2004: 
307)
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Like  Buchloh,  Wood  is  alarmed  by  any  suggestion  of  mere 
acceptance  of  Beuys’  statements  that  imply  common  symbolic 
meanings in the way the Christian God operated in Europe for 
several  centuries,  or  of  their  re-insertion  into  contemporary 
Western culture. For Wood, what characterises modern society is 
the  openness,  changes  and  plurality  of  possible  meanings,  in 
contrast to the closed worlds of traditional and primitive societies 
which are the objects of anthropological and ethnographical study. 
Caroline  Tisdall,  who,  from  Buchloh’s  perspective,  uncritically 
reads  Beuys’  statements  as  descriptive  and  explanatory,  notes 
again and again that in Beuys’ works art and life are not easily 
distinguishable and offers the following interpretation of Beuys’ 
“Bathtub”: 
It is the tub in which he was bathed as a child, extended in 
meaning through sculptural additions: sticking-plaster and 
fat-soaked gauze. The plaster indicates the wound, while 
fat  suggests  a  less  physical  level,  Beuys’  metaphor  for 
spirituality and the passage from one state to another. Fat 
can  appear  in  solid  or  liquid  form,  definite  in  shape  or 
chaotic in flow, according to temperature.  Of fat we will 
hear  more  later;  here  it  indicates  change,  transformation 
and substance – like the act of birth. (Tisdall 1995: 349) 
As Tisdall’s description makes clear, the “Bathtub” is not an empty 
tub, it is not a readymade. The tub shows signs of use and wear 
and as such evokes history. Moreover, it is not empty; inside we 
find plasters, gauze and fat, and as Tisdall notes, fat is a recurring 
material used by Beuys and as such calls for our attention. Why is 
it used here and elsewhere in Beuys’ work?
Gene  Ray  does  not  offer  an  interpretative  account  of  the 
“Bathtub”, but he does offer interpretative accounts of other works 
by Beuys involving fat and felt. Unlike Buchloh, he pays relatively 
little attention to the content of Beuys’ statements on the grounds 
that  even  if  Beuys  does  not  offer  us  enough  evidence  in  his 
statements that the works could be interpreted as anything other 
than conservative and naively utopian, primitive, anthropological 
artworks, they may nonetheless evoke other interpretations on the 
basis of their materiality. He thus argues that the works offer us 
enough  references  to  indicate  that  they  should  be  read  as  a 
response to the Holocaust, unbeknownst, perhaps, even to Beuys 
himself. Beuys’ own words and statements, Ray argues, “cannot be 
taken as infallible guides” because “he may not have been able to 
know or understand his deepest feelings about the Nazi period” 
(Ray  2001:  71).  Ray  proceeds  to  offer  very  convincing  and 
tempting interpretations of Beuys’ use of fat and felt as references 
to  the  Holocaust,  admitting  that  we  shall  never  know whether 
these where intentional on Beuys’ part or simply unconscious. 
Ray’s account is very tempting in that it offers an interpretation 
that  helps  to  explain,  and  more  importantly  justify,  Beuys’ 
remarkable  influence,  an  influence  which  has  inspired,  enabled 
and enriched so much of contemporary art production. And yet, 
we are left with the awareness that, whilst it is a tempting account, 
it  also  leaves  too  much  open  to  speculation  without  sufficient 
evidence.  In  the  observations  that  follow,  I  would  like  to  offer 
evidence  that  would  allow  us  to  both  stabilise  Ray’s  line  of 
interpretation  and  yet  keep  it  open  to  further  evidence  and 
interpretations; the source of which, in this instance, comes from 
the phenomenology of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger 
and his emphasis on language.  
Reading Beuys through Heidegger
I showed earlier that perhaps  the stumbling block in interpreting 
Beuys’ work is our interpretation of the status of his statements, 
many of which are highly provocative, utopian or simply too naïve 
to ring true and sincere. In her Lehman Lecture “The Old and the 
Chapter in Beuysian Legacies in Ireland and Beyond: Art, Culture and 
Politics, published by LIT Verlag, 2011 - part of the European Studies in 
Culture and Policy series (Series Editors Professor Ullrich Kockel and 
Professor Máiréad Nic Craith).  
New  Initiation  Rites:  Joseph  Beuys  and  Epiphany”,  Antje  von 
Graevenitz  points  out  that  Beuys  did  not  seek  either  to  speak 
symbolically  or  to  present  work  that  could  be  interpreted 
symbolically:  that  is,  he did  not  intend each comment,  gesture, 
visual image, or linguistic phrase to hold a symbolic meaning in a 
similar  way  to  those  of  priests  and  shamans.  Beuys,  she  says, 
stated in 1968, “I do not want to interpret, because then it would 
seem that  the things I  do are symbolic,  and they are not” (Von 
Graevenitz in Cook & Kelly 1996: 64). Von Graevenitz goes on to 
say  that  in  conversation,  Beuys  said  that  he  wanted  to  make 
“apparent only the things that already had meaning in their own 
right. He wanted to emphasise forgotten things” (von Graevenitz 
in Cook and Kelly 1996: 64). Beuys, it seems, is attempting to focus 
our attention on what exists, but is not always visible and seen, not 
because it  is  not  possible  to see it,  but  because  our attention is 
focused  elsewhere.  Von  Graevenitz  goes  on  to  argue  that  the 
problem has been a misinterpretation by art historians of the status 
of both images and real objects in Beuys’ work. 
In what follows, I would like to show that, through considering 
Beuys’ work in relation to the writings of Heidegger, we can gain a 
better understanding of the problems art historians face in their 
attempts to interpret Beuys’ work. Phenomenology for Heidegger 
is  not  the study of  what is  visible in our everyday life,  but  the 
capacity to allow that which is not otherwise visible – existence as 
such (Being) – to appear and become visible.   For Heidegger the 
visual  is  always  already  interpreted culturally  and thus  in  and 
through language. The capacity to allow that which is normally 
“forgotten”,  hidden  from  attention  in   everyday  engagement  – 
Being  as  such  –  to  appear,  is  in  and  through  language  and  it 
grammar. For example,  when we say ‘this is a woman’ or ‘this is a 
man’ we highlight 'Being',  in our everyday encounters we simply 
accept  this  and  work  with  it.  But  when  attention  is  paid  to 
language, as in the case of art, we can focus on the ‘is’, the 'being' 
of  something:  man,  woman.  We  claim  ‘being’  for   ‘man’  or 
‘woman’ and thus expose that such meaning could be re-thought. 
We become aware that these definitions are cultural constructions 
and could/might be interpreted differently. 
I  suggested that one clue that  an understanding of  Heidegger’s 
writings is relevant to understanding Beuys may well be Beuys’ 
insistence on the centrality of language and his prioritisation of the 
spoken word whilst presenting himself as a visual artist. And yet, 
a remarkable proportion of his visual work is speech. Tisdall notes 
that his performance at the Tate in 1972 was a six-and-a-half hour 
“blend of  art,  politics,  personal  charisma,  paradox and Utopian 
propositions” (Tisdall  1995:  339), and this was by no means the 
longest of his performances. I am proposing that our clue is to be 
found  in  Beuys’  utilisation  of  aspects  of  Heideggerian 
phenomenology and its emphasis on language, as well as some of 
Heidegger’s  ideas and themes,  in  an attempt  to  come to  terms 
with the changes he and his generation witnessed in Germany.
  
Beuys was educated under the Nazi  regime,  fought in the war, 
witnessed Germany’s defeat,  the atrocities it  committed and the 
guilt  and responsibility arising from the Holocaust, followed by 
the American ‘occupation’/liberation and economic recovery. Not 
an easy history to come to terms with, and even more difficult to 
respond to artistically. Strangely, if Beuys were to have produced 
works  that  simply  responded  to  Duchamp,  under  the  above 
circumstances he would have rightly been seen as conservative, 
probably  even  by  Buchloh.  On  the  other  hand,  if  Beuys  had 
produced works that sought to mourn those who suffered, they 
would  have  been  received  with  equal  difficulty,  since  in  some 
form, he was part of the generation responsible for it all and, as 
such, implicated.
  
I am not suggesting that Beuys was a Heidegger scholar, and it is 
likely  that  his  knowledge  of  Heidegger’s  philosophy  was  very 
Chapter in Beuysian Legacies in Ireland and Beyond: Art, Culture and 
Politics, published by LIT Verlag, 2011 - part of the European Studies in 
Culture and Policy series (Series Editors Professor Ullrich Kockel and 
Professor Máiréad Nic Craith).  
sketchy, at best. I have no evidence that Beuys ever read anything 
by Heidegger. And yet, there is evidence that he was familiar with 
at  least  some phrases and some Heideggerian concepts,  even if 
these were second or third hand. There is evidence that Beuys read 
the  works  of  Rudolf  Steiner,  who  edited  Goethe’s  scientific 
writings  and other  theoretical,  literary  and philosophical  works 
before  outlining  anthroposophy  as  an  educational  and  religio-
scientific  theory.  Though  Steiner  died  shortly  before  the 
publication of Heidegger’s major work, it is likely that his theory 
incorporated several early Heideggerian themes circulating at the 
time.
Beuys  read Steiner  in  the  1950s  and  I  am suggesting  here  that 
Beuys’ interest in Steiner indicates a receptivity to the ideas and 
arguments of Heidegger which were circulating in Germany at the 
time. For a generation that had to come to terms with so much, 
Heidegger  offered  some  form  of  anchor:  he  was  German,  he 
experienced the same difficult historical changes, he did support 
the Nazi party, albeit briefly, and was punished by being barred 
from teaching and only reinstated in the late 1950s when his works 
became very influential in France, Germany and beyond. Yet he 
never  apologised  for  or  renounced  his  brief  encounter  with 
National Socialism, and as such remains a politically problematic 
figure,  even  if  philosophically  highly  influential.  There  is  a 
similarity between Heidegger’s evident philosophical influence – 
many of his students became prominent philosophers, others used 
his  work as  a springboard – and his  persona and position as  a 
philosopher  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  and  Beuys’  artistic 
influence and problematic reception by art history. 
In 1947, Heidegger’s essay “Letter on Humanism” was published 
in French and German, and several other essays followed during 
the 1950s and 1960s. There is enough textual evidence to suggest 
that  Beuys  was  familiar  with  at  least  some  of  Heidegger’s 
linguistic phrases and thus probably more. Tisdall  quotes Beuys 
from his diary and the similarity between Heidegger and Beuys’ 
phrases  suggests  the  artist  was  at  least  familiar  with  the 
philosopher’s work. For example, he says: 
The purpose of philosophy is to arrive at materialism. In 
other words, to move towards death: matter. In order to be 
able  to  say  anything  about  life,  one  has  to  understand 
death. (Tisdall 1998: 79)
Whilst  this  comment  in  no  way  paraphrases  or  explicates 
Heidegger and could be seen to make references to Steiner,  the 
choice of  phrases used – beyond the reference  to materialism – 
cannot be explained without reference to Heidegger.  “Letter On 
Humanism”  was  written  in  response  to  Sartre’s  reference  to 
Feuerbach’s  comment  that  “the  question  of  whether  human 
thought achieves objective truth is not a question of theory but a 
practical question” (Feuerbach cited in Heidegger 1977b: 90). This 
is clearly visible in the above comment, but it is also visible in the 
numerous  references  made  by  Beuys  regarding  theory  and 
practice, in his spoken statements and his performances. But, if we 
are  still  in  any  doubt,  the  second  and  third  sentences  make 
unmistakable reference to the philosopher’s work; the notion of 
‘being towards death’ is a Heideggerian phrase and concept. The 
statement reflects Heidegger’s belief that probably one of the most 
important aspects of human life is our awareness that we are the 
sort  of ‘being’ who can also ‘not be’,  that  is  to say, die.  In that 
sense, Heidegger is sometimes also interpreted as an existentialist, 
on the basis of  his focus on existence articulated as ‘Being’. As is 
famously  known,  Heidegger  distinguished  ‘being’  from ‘Being’; 
the former is a sort of being (man, woman, hammer, stone), the 
latter is existence. The theme of ‘Being’, though not articulated as 
such, is repeated in various guises in Beuys’ work, such as death, 
birth,  warmth,  appearance,  forgetting,  language,  speech, 
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explanations,  theory,  practice.  All  are  central  themes  in 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. 
Like  Beuys,  Heidegger  suffers  from  the  fact  that   it  is  easy  to 
superficially  interpret  much  of  his   work  as  mere  mysticism, 
transcendentalism  and  naïve  utopianism.  Whilst  Heidegger 
inspired,  enabled  and/or  enriched  important  directions  in 
philosophy,  and  his  students  went  on  to  pursue  a  variety  of 
philosophical  new directions  – social  policy,  political  policy,  the 
development of the European Union itself and much else  – there 
remains  a  strong  voice  amongst  Anglo-American  philosophers 
that  insist  on  interpreting  Heidegger’s  work  in  terms  of  the 
mystical and transcendental.
 
As  has  become clear  from  the  discussion  so  far,  seeing  Beuys’ 
statements  as  descriptive  and  explanatory  is  not  necessarily 
always helpful in the construction of an interpretation that reflects 
the  importance  of  Beuys’  artworks.  We  need  to  look  for  other 
strategies in order to achieve this. Like Beuys, Heidegger presents 
us  with  what  might  seem  like  mystical  objects  belonging  to 
societies  that  did  share  in  a  common  symbolism,  societies 
anthropology  is  keen  to  explore.  For  example,  in  Heidegger’s 
essay “The Question Concerning Technology”, we are presented 
with the example of the chalice, an example Heidegger repeats in 
other contexts. The chalice is, of course, a religious object invested 
with  a  range  of  mystical  meaning,  including  the  imagery  and 
symbolism  of  drinking,  with  all  the  symbolism  this  evokes  in 
Western  Christian  culture.  Heidegger  utilises  it  in  order  to  re-
interpret  Aristotle’s  account  of  causality  (a  fourfold  causality 
discussed  for  example  in  Aristotle’s  Physics  (Aristotle  1957: 
165;/Physics/198a),  where  Aristotle  offers  four  causes:  material, 
form,  moving  force  and  goal  or  purpose.  Heidegger  develops 
Aristotle’s  account  and  offers  the  chalice  (evoking  complex 
cultural  concept  and  stable  object)  as  an  example  rather  than 
Aristotle’s candle wax or perfume (which point towards less stable 
substances). 
Heidegger’s language is strange here; he seeks to make language 
strange so that our attention will focus on the language as well as 
what it  communicates in order for it  to allow that which is not 
normally visible – Being - to appear. Heidegger says:  
The  silversmith  considers  carefully  and  gathers  together 
the  three  aforementioned ways  of  being  responsible  and 
indebted [material,  form, goal,  for the silversmith in this 
example is  the moving force].  To consider carefully is  in 
Greek  legein,  logos.  Legein  is  rooted  in  apophainesthai,  to 
bring  forward  into  appearance.  The  silversmith  is  co-
responsible  as  that  from  whence  the  sacrificial  vessel’s 
bringing forth and resting-in-self take and retain their first 
departure. (Heidegger 1977a: 8)
He goes on to say:
According  to  our  example,  they  [four  causes]  are 
responsible for the silver chalice’s lying ready before us as 
a  sacrificial  vessel.  Lying  before  and  lying  ready 
(hypokeisthai) characterises the presencing of something that 
presences.  The  four  ways  of  being  responsible  bring 
something  into  appearance.  They  let  it  come  forth  into 
presencing. (Heidegger 1977a: 9)
For  anybody  unfamiliar  with  Heidegger,  the  above  reads  as 
strange, mystical and incomprehensible. We might be forgiven for 
thinking that this text belongs to a different era or some primitive 
society,  the kind of  society  that  the  French anthropologist  Marc 
Augé describes:
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The indigenous fantasy is that of a closed world founded 
once  and  for  all  long  ago;  one  which,  strictly  speaking, 
does  not  have  to  be  understood.  Everything  there  is  to 
know  about  it  is  already  known:  land,  forest,  springs, 
notable features, religious places, … (Augé 1992: 44) 
And yet, whilst Heidegger’s writing may seem to belong to such a 
society,  this  is  precisely  what  he  is  seeking  to  open  up.  For 
Heidegger, such a society is governed by metaphysics, that is to 
say: everything is already known and thus closed, for example, the 
terms ‘man’ or ‘woman’ are utilised as if they were fixed and thus 
have  fixed  social,  political,  economic  and  ethical  implications. 
Heidegger’s project is  a critique of metaphysics and, as such, it 
seeks to open up this apparently closed system; it seeks to offer a 
way in which we need continuously to re-interpret the world. One 
of  the  reasons  why Heidegger  uses  Greek  terms  is  in  order  to 
propose  an  archaeology  that  would  uncover  how  we  came  to 
adopt the present meaning of what we now call ‘truth’; a term that 
for us today, he argues, functions like ‘God’ functioned in earlier 
Christian societies. 
Hence, Heidegger is not seeking to determine what ‘truth’ is, but 
to open up to un-concealment as appearance. But how, Heidegger 
asks,  “does  bringing-forth  happen?”  This  revealing  happens, 
according to  Heidegger,  through art  and through language.  For 
Heidegger, ‘art is the becoming and happening of truth’, truth in 
terms of un-concealment. Moreover, he says:
Truth is never gathered from objects that are present and 
ordinary.  Rather,  the  opening  up  of  the  Open,  and  the 
clearing  of  what  is,  happens  only  as  the  openness  is 
projected,  sketched  out,  that  makes  its  advent  in 
thrownness. (Heidegger 1971: 71)  
For Heidegger, we are always between birth and death. As such 
we  are  forever  re-interpreting  our  own being  and the  being  of 
what  appears  visually  in  art  (nature)  or  through  language. 
Precisely because art can present us with objects or acts we cannot 
simply understand,  art  can help us suspend earlier  conceptions 
and see things differently, it allows us to suspend our traditional 
view  and  consider  that  which  otherwise  we  will  not  consider. 
Equally, it is precisely when language does not operate smoothly 
to communicate, when it is strange as such, that the medium of 
language as such becomes unconcealed and ‘shows itself’. In other 
words, what shows itself is the Being of the medium. Of course, 
this  is  a  simplification  of  Heidegger’s  argument,  but  for  our 
purposes here it would suffice. At some level at least, this explains 
the  strange  archaic  and  constructed  language  that  Heidegger 
utilised, and thus we can gain some understanding of Beuys’ use 
of language.  
According to Tisdall, Beuys’ own version of biography merges art 
and  life  and  begins  with  birth:  “1921  Cleves:  Exhibition  of  a 
wound drawn together with plaster”. “Bathtub” refers directly to 
this event, “the wound or trauma experienced by every person” 
(Tisdall 1995: 349). Though Heidegger talks more about death than 
birth,  trauma,  death  and  birth  are  central  to  his  ontological 
account, where he distinguishes ‘Being’ from non-Being (pre-birth, 
after death), and where he also distinguishes ‘Being’ from being – 
the former is referred to as ontology (being as such) the latter as 
‘ontic’ where the focus is not on the existence of the being but its 
characteristics in space and time, its substance and its properties. 
Heidegger’s  ontological  methodology  focuses  on  the  ‘Being’  of 
beings in order to re-interpret, re-think the being and what we see 
as its properties. The Being under interpretation is always ‘me’, the 
self: a being that requires continual interpretation of Being.
Tisdall goes on to quote Beuys’ account of the “Bathtub”:
Chapter in Beuysian Legacies in Ireland and Beyond: Art, Culture and 
Politics, published by LIT Verlag, 2011 - part of the European Studies in 
Culture and Policy series (Series Editors Professor Ullrich Kockel and 
Professor Máiréad Nic Craith).  
My  intention  with  this  work  was  to  recall  my  point  of 
departure […]. It acts as a kind of autobiographical key: an 
object from the outer world, a solid material thing invested 
with  energy  of  a  spiritual  nature.  You  could  call  this 
substance, and it is the transformation of substance that is 
my  concern  in  art  […].  If  creativity  relates  to  the 
transformation,  change  and  development  of  substance, 
then it can be applied to everything in the world, and is no 
longer restricted to art. (Tisdall 1995: 349)  
Viewed through Heidegger, I think it becomes easier to see even 
the above comments about the “Bathtub” not simply as descriptive 
and  explanatory,  but  also  as  an  integral  part  of  Beuys’  work. 
Moreover, the anthropological references and the autobiographical 
references  now  become  part  and  parcel  of  an  attempt  at 
transformation, not necessarily metaphysical  transformation, but 
opening up new possible interpretations of one’s own being and 
the  being  of  other  ‘substance’  or  beings.  Beuys  goes  on to  talk 
about the fat, “lying there like a moulding or sculpting hand of the 
kind, which lies behind everything in the world. By this I mean 
creativity  in  the  anthropological  sense,  not  restricted  to  artists” 
(Tisdall  1995:  350).  Again,  seen  through  Heidegger,  if  Beuys  is 
looking  for  un-concealment,  his  project  can  be  seen  as  a  less 
metaphysical  one,  and  as  now  perhaps  even  approaching  the 
possibility of coming to terms with Germany’s past and opening 
the door to possible mourning.
In his essay “Joseph Beuys and the After Auschwitz Sublime”, Ray 
describes  the  way  in  which  Beuys’  uses  of  fat  can  be  seen  as 
references  to  the  Holocaust.  The  melting of  fat  on a  burner,  he 
argues, “was a blunt allusion to the crematoria of the Holocaust”. 
The  other  material  repeatedly  used  by  Beuys  is  felt.  As  Ray 
suggests, “the hair of Holocaust victims was shorn and collected at
the killing centres and shipped to German-owned factories, where 
it was processed into felt” (Ray 2001: 63). Moreover, Ray argues, 
“the darker resonance of felt and fat needs to be read back into the 
specific deployment of these materials across the whole of Beuys’ 
oeuvre” (Ray 2001: 64). Read through Heidegger, these references 
are one possible way in which appearances happen; the material, 
the substance, allows us to see things anew, not only ontologically, 
but also ontically: that is not only in relation to the Being of the 
being, but also to its specific properties as a being. 
For Beuys and the generation that was brought up under Nazism 
who saw the war and witnessed the Holocaust, it was not possible 
to simply mourn. Something else was necessary before mourning 
could  take  place.  Beuys  may  well  have  attempted  to  offer  this 
through his mix of art and life, his repeated use of felt and fat, his 
performances  and  his  use  of  spoken  words  as  well  as  his 
statements. Read in this way, it is also possible to understand why 
Beuys insists that his “personal history is of interest only in so far 
as I have attempted to use my life and person as a tool”, to bring 
about  new  appearances.  Equally,  Beuys’  disturbing  statement 
“every human being is an artist” can be read through Heidegger to 
simply mean that all human beings are capable of bringing about 
appearances and re-interpreting their own being in the context of 
other beings: and thus other beings in the network of connections 
and interrelations.     
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